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By, Holly Thomas 
The Curse of Diamonds 
Sierra Leone and Liberia have exported rough diamonds since the discovery of 
diamonds in the Mano River basin in the 1930s.i It was not until the late 20111 century 
when these minerals were nicknamed conflict diamonds, lootable resources sold to fund 
rebel movements and terrorist organizations. Conflict diamonds have been linked to civil 
war, corruption, and human rights violations. Both countries suffered through bloody 
civil wars, slow development, and a low standard of living. Sierra Leone's civil war 
resulted in thousands of deaths and the displacement of one-third of the countryii. 
Liberia's civil war resulted in over 200,000 deaths and displacement of more than a 
million Liberiansiii. Could diamonds be the link to these two countries' misfortune? 
Could a diamond curse exist as scholars have speculated The Oil Curse? 
Literature Review 
Oil wealth and mass poverty has come to be known as The Oil Curse. Political 
Scientists and Economists have long debated about the curse of natural resources with the 
most notorious natural resource under scrutiny being oil. According to the United 
Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, Africa is home to eight 
of the nine worst performing oil producers in the world. The curse of oil is not just 
implied to developing countries in Africa, but also to those in the Middle East (Ross 
2008) and Russia (Goldman 1999 and Goorha 2006), as well as mild forms of the curse 
in the Western world (Listhaug 2005). Scholarship on The Oil Curse follows along the 
themes of civil war, rentier state concept, bad governance and slow development, and 
human rights violations. 
Conflict and Civil War 
Scholars have found that oil-dependent states are more likely to be at risk for civil 
war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2001; Okrhulik 1999). 
Scholarship has found that oil is robustly correlated with the onset of civil war (Ross 
2006). Collier and Hoeffler argue that resource-linked conflict can be explained by two 
mechanisms: rebel greed and grievances of ethnic or political marginalization. 
Resentment of oil wealth distribution can cause violence among rebels leading to civil 
war (Ross 2004; Smith 2004; Torvik 2002; Wantchekon 1999). Natural resources that 
are lootable (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to cause conflict (Lujala, 
Gleditsch, & Gilmore 2005) and countries with lootable resources are more likely to have 
rebel groups that use random violence rather than rebels in countries with fewer lootable 
resources, which use violence strategically (Weinstein 2006). 
Other scholars argue that to explain oil-linked conflict more mechanisms must be 
analyzed as well as rebel greed and grievances, such as the greedy outsider mechanism 
(greed of other states that seek natural resources), feasibility mechanism (oil can be a way 
to finance rebellions either by the control of production or sale of 'booty' futures), weak 
states mechanism (weak state structures due to the lack of taxation and government 
accountability), and sparse networks mechanism (natural resource impact on the 
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economic relations between citizens due to weak manufacturing sectors) explain the link 
between natural resources and conflict more efficiently (Humphreys 2005). In regards to 
the sparse network mechanism, citizens compete rather than work together for oil wealth 
and donor aid (Shaxson 2007). Unlike in agriculture states where citizens are more likely 
to work together, in oil-enriched states the competition for wealth among citizens can 
lead to conflict. 
Scholars have argued against The Oil Curse, stating that there is little convincing 
evidence that an abundance of oil causes conflict (Di John 2007). These scholars believe 
that natural resources may prolong war, but do not cause war. On the contrary, 
scholarship that argues the curse of oil exists, have found that natural resource conflicts 
are more likely to end quickly, not with negotiation, but with a clear victory for one side 
(Humphreys 2005). Collier states that the most dangerous level of natural resource 
dependence is 26% of GDP and a country at this level has a conflict risk of23%, 
however if all circumstances of this country were the same with the exception of an 
abundance of commodity exports, the risk would drop to .5% (Collier 2000). Michael 
Watts disagrees with Collier stating it is not a curse, but an oil complex. He states that 
conflict in oil-enriched states is due to restructuring pre-existing forms of government 
(Watts 2004). 
The argument of natural-resource-linked-conflict is not purely black and white. 
Sometimes natural resources "fuel civil war" as in Congo- Brazzaville in the 1990s and 
yet other times natural resources do not. This gray area is explained by the stability of 
the government (Englebert & Ron 2004). 
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Rentier State Concept 
A rentier state refers to a state whose fiscal budget relies mainly on the export 
revenue 'rent' from its natural resource. In the past this has referred to gold, but in recent 
scholarship it is mainly attributed to oil (Okruhlik 1999). Oil production has been linked 
to authoritarian rule (Karl1997; Ross 2001; Wantchekon 1999) and affects a country's 
social structure (Ross 2008). Scholarship finds three explanations for why rentier states 
can fall doomed to the curse of oil and hinder democracy: the rentier effect, repression 
effect, and the modernization effect (Ross 2001). 
Rentier Effect 
The rentier effect refers to resource-enriched (notoriously oil) governments that 
use low tax rates (or enforce no taxes) and patronage to relieve themselves of great 
accountability to their citizens. Scholars attribute the rentier effect to reasons why 
governments and institutions are weak (Amuzegar 2008; Goorha 2006; Okruhlik 1999; 
Ross 2001)). Weakening state institutions are then prone to conflict (Fearon & Laitin 
2003; Snyder & Bhavnani 2005). There are three ways in which this effect may occur in 
rentier states. The first is called the taxation effect (Ross 2001). When governments 
derive their majority of revenue through the sale of oil, they do not tax heavily or at all. 
In return, the public is less likely to demand government accountability. Okruhlik states 
this as the opposite of democracy. For in an authoritarian oil-enriched state, there is "no 
representation without taxation." Second is the spending effect, in which oil wealth leads 
to spending on patronage and helps reduce the pressures for democracy (Ross 2001). 
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These governments raise food and fuel subsidies, increase welfare payments, provide free 
or low-cost healthcare, provide cheap education that is all financed by oil, simply buying 
off support for a non-democratic rule (Amuzegar 2008). Third is the prevention of social 
groups independent of the state called the group formation effect (Ross 2001 ). This 
effect prevents groups that may demand political rights. Ross states that all three effects 
of the rentier effect together imply "that a state's fiscal policies influence its regime type: 
governments that fund themselves through oil revenues and have larger budgets are more 
likely to be authoritarian; governments that fund themselves through taxes and are 
relatively small are more likely to become democratic." Shaxson and Wantchekon agree 
that oil-dependent states tend to undermine democratic government and find democracy 
hard to sustain. Countries that depend on oil for its wealth also have difficulty 
developing a market-based economy (Goorha 2006). The increased size of the public 
sector reduces the free-market sector (Amuzegar 2008). 
Repression Effect 
Oil wealth and authoritarian rule can be linked to repression. Governments of oil-
dependent states have the revenue to increase their spending on internal security, thus 
putting a stop on democratic aspirations of its citizens. The attraction of larger militaries 
includes the nation's self-interest along with response to rebel conflict (Ross 2001). 
Modernization Effect 
Social and cultural changes that tend to sustain democracy rely on certain 
development growths such as education and occupational specializations. If governments 
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do not spend more money on higher education and do not support non-oil sectors, 
democracy is hard to attain (Ross 2001). 
Bad Governance and Slow Development 
Oil companies have shifted the blame on governments arguing that The Oil Curse 
does not exist, but simply bad governance is to blame (Shaxson 2007). Some scholars 
agree with the notion of bad governance and oil corruption is a result of weak states (Karl 
1997; Shafer 1994.) Fearon and Laitin argue that oil states are more likely to have weak 
structures because they have less need for bureaucracies to raise revenue. Scholarship 
has attributed The Oil Curse to bringing about the Dutch Disease (Amuzegar 2008; 
Goorha 2006; Shaxson 2005; Smith 2004). The Dutch Disease occurs when large 
inflows of exchange cause real exchange rates to rise, in return damaging the local non-
oil sectors, thus creating fewer jobs (Shaxson 2005). The Dutch Disease therefore stunts 
the development of other sectors (Goorha 2006). Another problem with contracting a 
'Dutch Disease' is that while oil prices are high, governments raise their spending, but 
when oil prices fall, it's hard for governments to cut back, raising their national debt 
(Shaxson 2005). Financial crisis can then lead to conflict as well. 
Oil and mineral production has been linked to slow economic growth (Sachs and 
Warner 1995). Scholarship has produced debates on the slow economic growth and has 
attributed it to export volatility (Lutz 1994), however, Sachs and Warner found in their 
study that countries that export natural resources suffer from slow growth even after 
controlling for the impact of export instability. There is another argument that resource-
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rich states are not cursed by their resource wealth but rather by how they precede in the 
formulation of energy development strategies. State leaders pursue strategies that are 
most likely to ensure their political survival. These strategies are more politically rational 
and not necessarily economically rational (Luong 2001). In some cases, such as Russia, 
oil monies are improperly distributed to private individuals (Goldman 1999). Goldman 
states that rewards for unethical behavior are too high as well as the mismanagement of 
resources. Other scholars agree that mismanagement of oil wealth has a devastating 
effect on oil-enriched economies (Karl1997; Goorha 2006). 
When discussing economic growth and corruption, scholarship suggests that 
political scientists and economists cannot simply look at a country as having a 'national 
economy,' because the problem lies in fragmentations whether ethnic, religious, or 
political (Di John 2007; Shaxson 2007). Unequal distribution of rent (revenue from oil) 
among these fragmentations is the root cause of corruption (Ross 2004; Shaxson 2007; 
Smith 2004; Torvik 2002; Wantchekon 1999) along with oil companies bribing 
politicians (Shaxson 2007). 
Human Rights Violations 
Oil fields are frequently located in countries with bad human rights records. 
Scholarship on human right violations in regard to the curse of oil suggest that oil 
corporations can be part ofthe human rights problem instead of the solution (Eide, Ole 
Bergesen & Goyer 2000). Extraction of oil also leads to gender inequality (Amuzegar 
2008; Ross 2008). Oil production tends to reduce the role of women in the work force 
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and in return helps explain the low influence women have on government in oil-rich 
states. The reduced presence of females in the workforce increases fertility rates, 
decreases education for girls, and decreases the likelihood women would lobby for 
expanded rights (Ross 2008). 
With petrodollars flowing into the government, in theory, longevity would 
increase, infant mortality rates would decrease, and literacy rates would increase, but oil-
dependent states do not fare better than countries without an abundance of oil (Katz 
2004). The curse of oil has attributed to the bypass of health and education. Though 
some oil-dependent states provide free or low-cost healthcare and education to their 
masses (Amuzegar 2008) the low literacy rates and life expectancy and high infant 
mortality rates are evidence of their ineffectiveness. 
· Amuzegar argues that oil-enriched states increasingly violate human rights. He 
uses Iran as an example stating their government violates human rights by restricting 
freedoms such as religion, speech, conducting unlawful search and seizure, assaults on 
press freedom, restricting parliamentary elections, tightening Islamic code, vote 
tampering, disallowing labor unions, and restricting feminism study. 
A Curse of Diamonds 
Attention has been drawn to The Oil Curse, but not much scholarly literature has 
been devoted to the curse of diamonds. Few scholars have exclusively studied the impact 
diamonds have on an economy, government, and society. Most scholarship on diamonds 
is in regard to civil war. Diamonds can be directly correlated to the onset ofwar (Ross 
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2006), yet scholars argue as to what types of diamonds cause what types of conflict. 
Humphreys argues all diamonds can cause all types of conflict, however, some scholars 
have found that primary diamonds (nonlootable) reduce the prevalence and likelihood of 
ethnic wars whereas secondary diamonds (lootable) are more likely to fund rebelregimes 
and prolong ethnic wars (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2005). Studies also have found 
secondary diamond production weakens the state, which increases the risk of civil war 
(Snyder & Bhavnani 2005). Englebert and Ron argue that if a country has a stable 
government, more than likely conflict will not occur even if the country has an 
abundance of natural resources. They use the example of Botswana, a country with an 
abundance of diamonds, yet no civil war. They attribute this phenomenon to Botswana's 
success at building institutions. Other scholars also point to strong institutions being the 
difference when comparing countries such as Botswana and Sierra Leone (Collier et al. 
2003). However, Botswana has primary diamond deposits rather than secondary. A 
country such as Sierra Leone that has suffered from civil war contains secondary 
diamonds (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2005). 
Methodology 
This paper argues that the mechanisms attributed to The Oil Curse can be 
interrelated to diamonds as well. I test mechanisms attributed to The Oil Curse, changing 
the independent variable from oil to diamonds, on the two cases of Sierra Leone and 
Liberia, two diamond-enriched countries. I chose these two cases because of the limited 
scholarly literature on the possibility of a diamond curse. Since most scholarship on this 
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topic focuses on diamond-linked civil war, I chose two countries that have suffered 
through civil war. 
I test six hypotheses commonly attributed to the Curse of Oil, changing the 
independent variable from oil to diamonds. (HI) Diamonds help fund rebel 
organizations. (H2) Alluvial diamonds (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to 
cause conflict and prolong war. (H3) Diamonds provoke neighboring states' greed that 
seeks the natural resource. (H4) Diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect. 
HS Diamond-enriched states fall doom to bad governance and slow development. (H6) 
Diamond-enriched states have a bad record of human rights violations. My findings 
provide evidence for mechanisms that could be attributed to a diamond curse, different 
from those of the Oil Curse. 
Case 1: Sierra Leone 
Freed slaves from the United States, Nova Scotia, and Great Britain settled in 
Sierra Leone in 1787. Thousands of other freed slaves joined the settlement called 
"Freetown" and it soon became one ofBritain's first colonies in West Africa. The 
returned Africans came to be called Krio, descendents from all areas of Africa. Freetown 
was a peaceful coastal trading center throughout most of the 201h century. Sir Milton 
Margai, appointed Prime Minister, led Sierra Leone into a peaceful transition of 
independence in April 1961. Sir Albert Margai succeeded his brother as Prime Minister 
in 1964 under the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP).iv 
Elections were held in March 1967, Siaki Stevens, the All Peoples Congress 
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(APC) leader and Mayor of Freetown, was declared the new Prime Minister. In 1978, 
Stevens amended the constitution, banning all political parties, other than the ruling APC. 
During his time in office, Stevens built tax handles from informal deals made with a 
small group of Lebanese diamond merchants. Diamond channels not under Lebanese-
control were suppressed by government troops. To prevent a military coup and ensure 
political survival, Stevens weakened the state's coercive capabilities by limiting the 
military budget and capped the recruitment to 2,000 troops, a very small military for a 
country of 4 million. Tax handles that Stevens built began to deteriorate at the end of his 
rule, which increased the risk of an economic crisis. Lebanese merchants became less 
dependent on Stevens because of the wealth they acquired under his rule ironically 
allowed them to hire personal armies. Balance of coercive power began to shift in favor 
of the Lebanese diamond traders, initiating a trend of declining government revenue: 
about 70% of exports left the country through non-formal, nontaxable channels, and little 
revenue went into the state treasury (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Stevens remained in 
office until1985, peacefully transitioning power to APC military commander, Major 
General Joseph Saidu Momoh. 
On October 1, 1985, Momoh was elected President, however, he did amend the 
constitution in 1991, re-establishing a multi-party system.v Momoh inherited a country 
on the verge of collapsing (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). Because the APC abused power, 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) under the leadership of a former-corporal, began 
terrorizing villages in eastern Sierra Leone on the Liberian border. The RUF gained 
control of the diamond mines in the Kono district and pushed the military back to 
Freetown. vi Momoh lacked the coercive resources to fight off the RUF because Stevens 
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had reduced the size of the military. Stevens made sure his successor would be weak so 
that he could remain in Sierra Leone and enjoy his wealth without being threatened. 
Momoh attempted to gain control of the country's diamonds but failed. Sierra Leone 
reported $22,000 in diamond exports in 1988; however, the Lebanese exported $250 
million worth of diamonds annually. In 1989, only 12 carats were exported through 
official channels (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). 
Momoh could not pay the army because of the lack of revenue. When the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an invasion from Liberia in 1991, the Sierra 
Leone's under-funded military disintegrated. The RUF seized control of Sierra Leone's 
diamond fields and used the income from diamonds to finance a decade ofviolence and 
civil war. vii During this conflict, civilians were terrorized. Women and young girls were 
raped by the RUF. Children were kidnapped and served on the front lines for the rebels. 
Girls were kidnapped and given to rebels as slave wives and some fought as soldiers 
(Park 2006; Mazurana and McKay 2006). Rape was used as a weapon during Sierra 
Leone's civil war (Ferris 2007). In a report published in 2002, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and Save the Children UK found that women in Sierra Leone 
faced sexual violence in the country, on the way to and in refugee camps. Sexual 
exploitation was also "perpetrated by aid workers, peacekeepers, and community leaders" 
(Ferris 2007, 585). The government later began recruiting children to fight as well. 
During this time many children, especially girls, did not attend school in fear of the 
violence. An estimated 70 percent of children had no access to education (Maclure & 
Denov 2009, 613). Healthy men were also forced to work in diamond mines. While RUF 
controlled most of the diamonds, the people of Sierra Leone were among the poorest in 
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the world. The RUF used fear tactics such as amputation, rape, and murder to terrorize 
civilians. Over one-third of the civilians were displaced and those who were sent to 
refugees fared no better due to starvation and high disease rates. Global Witness 
published a monograph For a Few Dollars More that stated al Qaeda operatives 
purchased Sierra Leonean diamonds from the RUF, between December 2000 and 
November 2001, and sold them in Europe (Grant & Taylor 2004). 
A military coup was launched on April29, 1992, which forced Momoh into exile 
and gave the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) control of Sierra Leone. The 
NPRC could not repel the RUF and they continued to terrorize more and more of the 
country. The NPRC hired mercenaries from the private firm Executive Outcomes that 
pushed the RUF from the countryside to the borders. After international pressure, the 
NPRC agreed to transition the country back into a civilian government and elections were 
held in April 1996. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a UN diplomat, won the presidential election 
and the country returned to a parliamentary system until the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) overthrew the President on May 25, 1997. Atrocities grew when the 
RUF joined the new government, but with the help of the ECOMOG forces, democracy 
was restored 10 months later. With the assistance ofthe international community, 
President Kabbah and the RUF leader signed the Lome Peace Agreement on July 7, 1999. 
This agreement gave the RUF positions in the government. The ECOMOG and UN sent 
troops in for additional peacekeeping. In April 2002, ECOMOG forces departed and soon 
after the RUF began violating the agreement. On May 8, 2000, members of the RUF 
killed 20 people in Freetown protesting against RUF violations. As a result, RUF leaders 
were stripped of their government positions, though fighting continued in the country. 
13 
The Guinean forces were able to attack the RUF bases in Sierra Leone in late 
2000. The government of Sierra Leone began to reassert its authority and disarmament 
progressed; about 72,000 ex-combatants had been disarmed and demobilized by 2002. 
President Kabbah officially declared the civil war over on January 18, 2002 and 
peacekeeping forces were withdrawn throughout the next five years. The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in 2002 with the help of the United Nations to 
try those who bore the responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
violations ofhumanitarian law. The SCSL issued indictments against warring fractions 
including former Liberian President Charles Taylor. viii 
Alluvial diamond mining continues to account for nearly half of Sierra Leone's 
exports. With the help of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, conflict diamonds 
have decreased. The increase in political stability has led to a revival ofbauxite and 
rutile mining, adding revenue to the country. The government's current priorities include 
creating jobs for the public, enhancing development, and stopping corruption.ix Sierra 
Leone continues to rely on significant amounts of foreign assistance, focused on the 
consolidation of peace, democracy, human rights, health education and care.x 
Case 2: Liberia 
Freed African-Americans slaves along with a group of immigrants, who became 
known as Americo-Liberians, settled in Liberia in 1820. Following settlement, thousands 
of freed American and African-American slaves joined. The Republic ofLiberia 
declared its independence on July 26, 1847; however, indigenous Africans were excluded 
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from citizenship until 1904. Joseph Roberts, born in America, served as the first Liberian 
President. The new republic, monopolized by the America-Liberian elite, was a one-
party state ruled by the True Whig Party with a government and constitution built along 
similarities to the United States. The Liberian economy relied on the mining of iron ore 
and the export of natural rubber. The country was peaceful except for occasional 
opposition from the indigenous Africans, but on April 12, 1980, peace was disrupted 
when indigenous Liberian Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, of the Krahn ethnic group, 
staged a military coup and began a decade long authoritarian rule after executing the 
President and many Americo-Liberian officials, formulating the People's Redemption 
Council (PRC). 
Ethnic tensions and hostility rose as Doe began promoting members of the Krahn 
ethnic group, who soon dominated the government and the Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL). The economic growth rate slowed due to a decline in the demand for iron ore 
and government mismanagement. An increase in human rights abuses and corruption, 
and a decrease in the standard of living and economy followed. Despite Doe's poor 
human rights record and lack of democratic characteristics in policy, Doe received U.S. 
financial support from President Ronald Reagan, an ally, however, on December 24, 
1989, Charles Taylor and his rebels, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), 
invaded Liberia from Cote d'lvoire and soon gained the support of many Liberians. A 
former member of the NPFL forn1ed a breakaway movement called the Independent 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) who killed Doe on September 9, 1990. 
Former AFL soldiers that had taken refuge in SieiTa Leone founded the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), to fight back the NPFL and INPFL.xi 
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During the civil war, these warring fractions recruited and kidnapped children to 
use as soldiers and slave wives (Human Rights Watch 1994; Mazurana & McKay 2006). 
Rape was used as a weapon during Liberia's civil war (Ferris 2007). In a report 
published in 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Save the 
Children UK found that women in Liberia faced sexual violence in the country, on the 
way to and in refugee camps. Sexual exploitation was also "perpetrated by aid workers, 
peacekeepers, and community leaders" (Ferris 2007, 585). Rebels, child solders, and 
Liberian military forces raped and murdered civilians (Human Rights Watch 1994). 
After several peace accords, disarmament and demobilization of warring fractions 
followed after Taylor agreed to special elections in Liberia. On July 19, 1997, Charles 
Taylor and the NPFL won the election primarily because Liberians feared a prolonged 
civil war, however, the NPFL did nothing to improve Liberians' standard of living with 
little investment made in the country's infrastructure. For their six-year rule, 
unemployment and illiteracy rose above 75 perceneii Instead of supporting the needs of 
Liberians, Taylor supported the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. The RUF 
smuggled conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone into Liberia. Liberia became a major 
blood diamond exporter smuggling conflict diamonds in from Sierra Leone and Angola. 
Liberia had also become a channel for al Qaeda to purchase conflict diamonds (Le Billon 
2006). In early 2003, armed rebellions, such as the Liberians United for Reconciliation 
and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), emerged 
from Taylor's former adversaries because ofhis misuse of power. 
The civil war devastated the country's economy. Iron ore production stopped, 
major businesses were destroyed, and foreign investors and businesses left the country. 
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Liberia gained no revenue on timber and diamond exports because of the UN ban on 
conflict diamonds and other natural resources funding armed conflict. Fighting continued 
regardless of several cease-fire agreements between the government, LURD, and 
MODEL, at the civilians' expense. President Taylor resigned on August 11, 2003, after 
pressure from the U.S. and the international community. Taylor's departure into Nigeria 
prompted a peacekeeping mission by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) with 3,600 troops, followed by 12,000 troops from the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL ). 
The UN lifted sanctions on Liberian timber in 2006 and diamonds in 2007. And 
the economy has begun to slowly progress gaining revenue also from rubber exports and 
revenue from its maritime registry program. In 2005, Liberia held presidential elections, 
the most fair and peaceful elections in the country's history. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, of the 
Unity Party, won and became Africa's first elected female president. Since the elections, 
Liberia's progress has increased rapidly. The public and the country's elites support 
President Sir leaf, reasserting the government's authority and the public's hope for better 
living standards. President Sirleafworks closely with international donors on Liberia's 
development, aiming at rebuilding the country's infrastructures and economic recovery. 
Over 100,000 ex-combatants have been disarmed and with the help ofthe U.S., the 
country's military has been reconstructed.xiii The government's current priority is 
creating jobs in the new gold mining sector, attracting foreign investment, and providing 
the public with better education and healthcare programs including the improvement of 
other essential needs to the masses.xiv 
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Findings 
Sierra Leone 
Hypothesis 1: Diamonds help fund rebel organizations. There is evidence for this 
hypothesis. The RUF seized control of the diamond mines and used the revenues to fund 
their movement for over a decade. Liberian President Taylor supported the RUF and in 
return the RUF smuggled diamonds into Liberia. Terrorist organizations, such as al 
Qaeda, purchased conflict diamonds. 
Hypothesis 2: Alluvial diamonds (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to 
cause conflict and prolong war. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The diamonds 
were lootable making it easily accessible to rebels; however, Sierra Leone had earned 
revenue from alluvial diamonds since the 1930s. Other variables accounted for the cause 
of Sierra Leone's war, such as weak structures, weak military, corruption, political 
instability, and an economy in crisis. Diamonds did fund the RUF and kept them armed 
prolonging war, but one could not say alluvial diamonds caused the war. Because of 
Sierra Leone's accessible diamonds, the RUF was able to easily smuggle diamonds into 
Liberia, helping fund rebel leader Taylor, prolonging Liberia's civil war. 
Hypothesis 3: Diamonds provoke neighboring states' greed that seeks the natural 
resource. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Stevens built tax handles by constructing 
informal deals made with Lebanese diamond merchants. Balance of coercive power 
began to shift in favor of the Lebanese diamond traders, resulting in low diamond expmi 
18 
r 
revenue for Sierra Leone. Neighboring Liberia became a major trader in conflict 
diamonds thanks to the RUF smuggle diamonds into the country, exporting over $300 
million in diamonds annually. 
Hypothesis 4: Diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect. There is 
partial evidence that diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect, even though 
Sierra Leone is more properly categorized as a merchant state. The country was under 
authoritarian rule from 1978-1991, when Stevens banned political parties other than his 
own. A conflict prolonged by alluvial diamonds hindered the progress of democracy in 
Sierra Leone by further weakening the state. Because of informal tax handles and 
smuggled diamonds, the country was cheated out of revenue and could not provide for its 
civilians. A lack of investment in development and other revenue sectors infected the 
country with the Dutch disease. The government and rebels violated human rights before 
and during Sierra Leone's civil war. Democracy is slowly progressing in the country that 
has suffered from inequality in income distribution. The government created a mining 
community development fund, which returns a portion of diamond revenue to mining 
communities, raising local stakes in the legal diamond industry. 
Hypothesis 5: Diamond-enriched states fall doom to bad governance and slow 
development. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Sierra Leone's economy prospered 
until Stevens took office and the country fell into authoritarian rule. Stevens built tax 
handles from informal deals that cheated the country out of diamond revenue. A balance 
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of coercive power began to shift in favor of Lebanese diamond traders Stevens formed 
deals with and most of Sierra Leone's diamond revenue was gained by the Lebanese. 
Stevens weakened the state by not investing revenue into development and social welfare 
programs. He also weakened country's coercive capabilities by limiting the military 
budget and placing a cap on recruitment. During his time in office, the economic growth 
rate slowed because of a decline in the mining sector and an increase in government 
corruption. When President Momoh was elected, he re-established the multiparty system, 
but could do little to improve the state's economic crisis. The country's main revenue 
export, diamonds, were no longer under the country's control. Momoh inherited a weak 
military that could not repel invading rebels leading the country into a civil war funded 
by diamonds. Much of Sierra Leone's formal economy was destroyed during this time. 
Civilians lived in terror, while the government could not protect them. Human rights 
violations increased while education and healthcare declined as the country tore itself 
apart. 
Hypothesis 6: Diamond-enriched states have a bad record of human rights 
violations. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The state itself violated human rights 
by not providing efficient education, healthcare, and security. The civil war caused the 
displacement of over one-third of the population and thousands of lives were lost. Rebels 
amputated those they did not kill or kidnap. Children were forced to serve on regime's 
front lines, forced into marriages, and served as slaves. Even the refugee camps violated 
civilians' human rights by sexual violence and disease. 
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Liberia 
Hypothesis 1: Diamonds help fund rebel organizations. There is evidence for this 
hypothesis. Warring fractions such as the ULIMO and NPFL, along with other 
breakaway movements, funded their armies with diamonds. President Taylor and the 
NPFL supported the RUF, while they smuggled diamonds into Liberia. The Washington 
Post reported that following September 11, 2001, al Qaeda had purchased millions of 
dollars worth of rough diamonds from the RUF, using Liberia as a channel. 
Hypothesis 2: Alluvial diamonds (easily accessible to rebels) are more likely to 
cause conflict and prolong war. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The diamonds 
were lootable making it easily accessible to rebels; however Liberia had earned revenue 
from alluvial diamonds since the 1930s. Other variables accounted for the cause of 
Liberia's war, such as weak structures, corruption, political instability, and a decline in 
the economy. Diamonds did funded Liberia's corrupt government and hostile rebels, 
keeping them armed and prolonging war, but one could not say diamonds were the cause 
of war. Because of the accessibility of Liberian, Angolan, and Sierra Leoni an diamonds, 
rebels and corrupt government officials easily smuggled them in and out ofLiberia, 
prolonging war. 
Hypothesis 3: Diamonds provoke neighboring states' greed that seeks the natural 
resource. I did not find evidence for this hypothesis. Liberia exported diamonds from 
neighboring countries, such as Angola and Sierra Leone, more so than other countries 
seeking Liberian diamonds. 
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Hypothesis 4: Diamonds hinder democracy due to the rentier effect. There is 
partial evidence that diamonds hindered democracy due to the rentier effect, even though 
diamonds are not Liberia's main sector and more properly categorized as a merchant 
state. During Liberia's authoritarian rule, the country did suffer from the Dutch disease, 
as the government let other mining and business sectors decline. Doe's rule caused 
ethnic tensions and hostilities when the Krahn group dominated politics and the military. 
The standard of living deteriorated, human rights violations increased, and the economy 
declined. Smuggling diamonds and earning revenue from these conflict minerals were 
hard to tax, and the government invested little in infrastructure and development. 
Democracy was hindered by violence that was funded and prolonged by alluvial 
diamonds. Today, democracy is progressing in Liberia. 
Hypothesis 5: Diamond-enriched states fall doom to bad governance and slow 
development. There is evidence for this hypothesis. Liberia was a major world exporter 
in iron ore, but when Doe staged a military coup and the country fell under his 
authoritarian rule, revenue-gaining sectors were neglected and the government 
mismanaged resource wealth, not investing money into bureaucracies or social welfare 
programs. Corruption and human rights violations increased while the economy 
declined, which prompted a civil war. Though democracy was re-established through 
elections, President Taylor did little for Liberians. He focused his support for the RUF, 
neglecting Liberia's business sectors and needs of the masses. For example, roads, 
schools, and hospitals were destroyed and bypassed. Unemployment rose, education 
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declined, and atrocities became more violent. The country's civil war destroyed 
businesses and devastated foreign investment. Diamonds and other natural resources 
such as Timber were used to fund rebel movements, while Liberians lived in terror. The 
standard of living deteriorated for Liberians while their government did little to improve 
their safety, health, and wellbeing. Many civilians lived without running water or 
electricity. 
Hypothesis 6: Diamond-enriched states have a bad record of human rights 
violations. There is evidence for this hypothesis. The state itself violated human rights 
by not providing efficient education and healthcare. The military was strong, but did not 
provide security for Liberians. The civil war caused the displacement of more than one 
million civilians that did not fare better in refugee camps. Refugees were raped or 
tortured or suffered from lack ofbasic needs. Many children were kidnapped to serve as 
soldiers and slave wives. Over 200,000 Liberians were killed during the civil war. 
Conclusion 
I found that the Curse of Oil mechanisms could be found in the cases of Sierra 
Leone and Liberia when changing the independent variable from oil to diamonds. 
However, there is not full support for all of the hypotheses. I found support for# out of 
the six hypotheses in the case of Sierra Leone and # out of the six hypotheses in the case 
of Liberia. Major differences in my findings lead me to believe that other factors 
attribute to the Curse of Diamonds. Consolidating past scholarship on the Curse of Oil, 
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one would hypothesize that the curse exists (a) when the country contains an abundance 
of oil, (b) the government owns the oil, (c) the government falls doom to the rentier 
effect, (e) the country suffers from slow development and (f) conflict arises from rebels, 
(h) and all actors violate human rights. 
After identifying the Curse of Oil in a model format, I formulated another model 
in which evidence in the two cases support for a theory on the Curse of Diamonds. My 
theory suggests that a Curse of Diamonds exists (a) when a country is enriched with 
alluvial diamonds, (b) the government mismanages revenue, (c) weakens the state, (d) 
causing conflict, (e) rebels fund their organizations with the diamonds, (f) engage in 
conflict, (g) distribute diamonds to other rebel organizations, and (h) all actors violate 
human rights. Since six out 15 alluvial diamond-producing states experienced civil war 
between 1990-2002, I believe this model should be tested on the remaining four states 
that experienced civil war to see if this curse exists. It is important to analyze cases that 
may be correlated with the Curse ofDiamonds because of the current situation in 
Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Both countries are showing signs of 
mechanisms related to the same Curse of Diamonds Sierra Leone and Liberia fell under. 
Human Rights Watchxv, Al Jazeeraxvi, and The Associated Pressxviireported atrocities 
linked to conflict diamonds in the two countries. Rape warfare, torture, and murder are 
being conducted according to these reports. Could the curse account for Zimbabwe and 
the D.R. of Congo's misfortune? 
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i See http://www .allaboutgemstones. com/ conflict -diamonds _liberia.html 
ii See The CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ geos/ sl.html 
iii See The CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ geos/li.html 
iv See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm 
v See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm 
vi See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm 
vii See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm 
viii See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm 
ix See The CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ geos/ sl.html 
x See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm 
xi See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm 
xii See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htrn 
xiii See The U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm 
xiv See The CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/ geos/li.html 
xv See http://www.hrw.org Human Rights Watch "Diamonds in the Rough: Human 
Rights Abuses in the Marange Diamond Fields of Zimbabwe" (2009) and "DR Congo: 
Civilian Cost of Military Operation is Unacceptable" (Oct. 13, 2009) and "DRC: Clinton 
Should Highlight Rape and Justice Issues" (Aug. 10, 2009) and "Diamonds Deadly Toll" 
(June 26, 2009) 
xvi See http://AIJazeera.net AlJazeera "Rape Used as Weapon in D.R. Congo" (Oct. 23, 
2009) 
xvii Associated Press "Diamond Watchdog Gives Zimbabwe Time to Comply" (Nov. 6, 
2009) 
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.· 
The Booth Library Awards for Excellence in Student Research and Creativity Jury, 
In the fall of 2009, I began my first semester of graduate school in the Political Science 
Department. Though I learned excellent writing skill from Eastern's undergraduate 
program in Journalism, my research skills were amateur at best. 
I was nervous when I began researching and did not know how to proceed until Jocelyn 
Tipton gave a lecture in an orientation style Political Science course where she outlined 
the resources Booth Library and staff provided. 
I contacted Jocelyn in less than a week from when she spoke. She was quick to set an 
appointment and told me not to stress out about it because she would help. During a 30-
minute appointment, she helped me use the research computers and showed me the 
simplest and most beneficial way to search through the online journals. Before the end of 
our appointment I had already found 10 literary scholars that I could use for my paper 
titled, "IR Theory and State Cooperation on Blood Diamonds." 
Jocelyn said I could set up another appointment if I needed, however, I was able to 
complete my research and paper early in the semester using the library's resources and 
using the techniques I was taught to use my time well. 
I enjoyed the research so much that I kept the same topic for another paper titled, "Curse 
ofDiamonds," also completed in Fall2009. Because I began my research early and had a 
motivator in my comer (Jocelyn), my research papers were not a burden, but an 
accomplishment that I thoroughly enjoyed completing. I am even going to be the first 
EIU Political Science graduate student to present internationally (in May 201 0), with my 
first graduate research paper, "IR Theory and State Cooperation on Blood Diamonds." 
I have attached both research papers in hopes of one or both of them becoming a part of 
the Booth Library Student Research and Creativity Collection. I hope other students have 
found how to use the library's resources to further their own studies! I owe a great deal 
to the library staff and Eastern for providing me with such advanced resources to use for 
my research. 
Sincerely, 
~;A f/YY/d 5 
Holly Thomas 
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By, Holly Thomas 
IR Theory and State Cooperation on Blood Diamonds 
Abstract 
Blood diamonds, or "conflict diamonds," have funded rebel movements and terrorist 
organizations worldwide. Bloodshed over these diamonds, the conflicts they prolonged, 
and the horrific human rights violations associated with the competition for this natural 
resource, resulted in an international effort to regulate rough diamonds, and has become a 
top priority for states, institutions, non-government organizations (NGOs), media, and the 
public. Forums were held in 2001, known as the Kimberley Process, to discuss the threat 
of conflict diamonds. With the United Nations' support, state and non-state actors 
devised the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a non-legally binding 
agreement to stop the import and export of conflict .diamonds. What accounts for the 
creation of the Kimberley Process? What accounts for state compliance in regards to the 
KPCS? It is important to account for this cooperation because of the threat blood 
diamonds pose on an individual, sub-systemic, and systemic level. Countries currently 
violate the KPCS and are engaging in human rights violations and endanger the 
legitimacy of the diamond industry. Success and sustainability ofthe KPCS is essential · 
to combat blood diamonds, promote human rights, and keep the industry afloat. This 
paper examines the utility of three International Relations theories, realism, 
neoliberalism, and constructivism, to help explain the existing cooperation of 
governments, industry, and civil society to address this problem. The findings indicate 
all three theories lack a complete explanation for state compliance and the role of non-
state actors regarding the KPCS. The analytical limitation of these theories calls for a 
new model to explain world politics shifted by government, industry, and civil society . 
Diamonds symbolize love, marriage, scarcity, and wealth. This illusion has been 
engrained in people's heads since the De Beers Diamond Trading Company's successful 
marketing campaign with slogans such as "A Diamond Lasts Forever." (Gooch 2008; 
Spar 2006) Little girls are taught to dream about that big, shiny rock that they will one 
day wear. Americans buy half of the diamonds jewelry worldwide (Gooch 2008, 189) for 
weddings, anniversaries, and other occasions for sentimental gifts. But before that 
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diamond is placed on her left hand, its journey there may have financed a gun in the 
hands of a child, drug running, or even a terrorist attack. 1 
Blood diamonds, also known as "conflict diamonds," are rough diamonds that 
rebel movements sell to fund armed conflict aimed at overthrowing legitimate 
governments.2 Terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, have been known to fund their 
attacks with blood diamonds as well. (Gooch 2008, 190; Grant & Taylor 2004, 388; 
Pickrell2002, 90; Le Billon 2006, 778) The nature of the atrocities executed by such 
rebels as Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Angola's Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), Liberia's United Liberian Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia (ULIMO) and National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), caught the 
international community's attention in the 1990s. Blood diamond greed was linked to 
citizen displacement, rape, amputation of limbs and murder. 3 It also groomed a 
generation of illiterate child soldiers to steal, rape and murder. (Ferris 2007; Human 
Rights Watch 1994; Mazurana & McKay 2006) 
Blood diamonds account for 3 to 15 percent ofthe global diamond trade, 
generating as much as $7 billion per year in revenues. To put this in perspective, "$1 
million could buy 100,000 second-hand Kalashnikov rifles." (Bukhalter 2003, 73) 
Bloodshed over the diamonds and the conflicts they prolonged caused global governance 
1 The 2009 PAC Diamonds and Human Security Annual Review stated, "Before 2003, 
about 25% of the world's diamond trade was in some way illicit. Diamonds, completely 
unregulated, were used for money laundering and tax evasion, for drug running, gun 
running, sanctions busting and terrorist financing. Human Rights Watch and Global 
Witness also published reports of diamonds funding crime from 1998-currently. 
2 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Preamble available at 
http://www .kimberleyprocess.com 
3 Global Witness, PAC, and Human Rights Watch reported atrocities available at 
www.globalwitness.org, www.partnershipafricacanada.org, and 
yv_y.;w_bumanrightswatch.or_g_ 
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on regulating rough diamonds to become a top priority for states, institutions, non-
government organizations (NGOs), media, and the public. (Grant & Taylor 2004) 
A forum was held in Kimberley, South Africa, to discuss the threat of conflict 
diamonds. With support from the United Nations, the answer to reducing conflict 
diamonds from emerging into the legitimate diamond business became known as the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.4 Since blood diamonds are usually 
indistinguishable from legit diamonds (Pickrell 2002), states would need a certification of 
origin tracing the diamond shipments' every move from the original mine. States were 
encouraged to enforce internal securities as well. (Wright 2004, 699) Governments, the 
World Diamond Council and other industry leaders, and NGOs discussed the process for 
over two years in a series of intergovernmental meetings known as the Kimberley 
Process.5 (Bukhalter 2003, 73; Grant & Taylor 2004) On January 1, 2003, the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was implemented6 however; some participants 
were not prepared and were given a grace period issued until July 31, 2003. (Grant & 
Taylor 2004) Seventy-four countries currently participate in the Kimberley Process.7 
The KPCS is not a legally binding treaty between states, but a set of standards 
regulated by its own national legislation dealing with the import and export of rough 
diamonds from its territory. (Wright 2004, 699) What accounts for the creation of the 
Kimberley Process? What accounts for state compliance in regards to the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme? I first test the utility of three International Relations 
4 See id. 2 
5 Information on meetings conducted prior to scheme implementation can be found at 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
6 See Id. 2 
7 A current list of participating countries can be found at 
http: //www.kimberleyprocess.com as well as http://www.diamondfacts.org 
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theories, realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism, on the international phenomenon of 
governments, industry, and civil society working together in global affairs. I argue in this 
paper that all three theories provide insight on world politics in the case ofthe Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme, and no one theory accurately analyzes the big picture of 
cooperation. It is important to account for this cooperation because of the threat blood 
diamonds pose on an individual, sub-systemic, and systemic level. Though the civil war 
in Sierra Leone that brought attention to conflict diamonds is over, countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo are currently in violation of the KPCS by 
exporting and importing blood diamonds. 8 These countries are engaging in human rights 
violations, endangering the legitimacy of the diamond industry and countries that 
participate in the KPCS. The possible backlash ofblood diamonds could devastate 
economies such as in Botswana and India that depend on legitimate diamond sales. 
(Wright 2004, 698-99) Success and sustainability of the KPCS is essential to combat 
blood diamonds, promote human rights, and keep the diamond industry afloat.9 
Literature Review 
Scholars have attempted to analyze state cooperation through various 
International Relation theories such as realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism. These 
theories explain state behavior by focusing on different key actors in decision-making, 
8 See Id. 3 Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, and AlJazeera (available at 
http://www.AlJazeera.net) reported KPCS violations in Zimbabwe and D.R. of Congo. 
The 2009 PAC Diamonds and Human Security Annual Review also reported both 
countries in violation. The AP reported the threat ofblood diamonds in Zimbabwe in the 
article, "Diamond Watchdog Gives Zimbabwe Time To Comply." 
9 See Id. 3 also review "Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War" published by the UN 
available at http://www.un.org/peace/africa/diamond.html 
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analyzing the state's benefits for cooperation, and prediction for duration of such a 
commitment. 
Realism 
Hans Morgenthau dominated International Relations with his classical realism 
theory whereas nation states are the primary actors in international affairs and strive for 
survival and success regardless of morality, a response to idealism. Nation states are seen 
as rational actors living in a world of anarchy that behave in their own self-interest and 
compete for distribution of power, a characteristic rooted in human nature. Realism 
defines interest in terms of power because moral laws that govern the universe are 
different for each state. (Morgenthau 1961) Kenneth Waltz built upon Morgenthau's 
theory stating neorealism "contends that international politics can be understood only if 
the effects of structure are added to traditional realism's unit-level explanations." (Waltz 
1990, 34) He stated that realists fail to consider structure as a force that shapes states and 
their behavior. Neorealists focus on anarchy being the driving force of state behavior 
rather than human nature, as classical realists such as Morgenthau stated. (Waltz 1990; 
Morgenthau 1961) Since the structure of anarchy has not changed since the end of the 
Cold War, state behavior should not expect to change. States will cooperate with each 
other, but still have conflicting interests and lust for power that could lead to war . 
(Mearsheimer 2002) Realists find war to be a "legitimate instrument of statecraft" 
(Mearsheimer 2002, 25) and unpreventable due to anarchy. (Waltz 1959) 
Realists have a pessimistic outlook on prospects for international cooperation and 
capabilities of international institutions. Realism finds two major barriers to international 
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cooperation: state's concerns about cheating and relative achievements of gains. (Grieco 
1988) States maintaining their position in the system is their first concern rather than 
increases power. (Walz 1979) States must pay attention to their partners' gains because 
they act as independent actors in anarchy and fear for their survival. Realists believe 
international institutions affect the prospects for cooperation slightly. (Grieco 1988) 
States would not join unless they expected to receive proportionate advantages . 
(Morgenthau 1961) If a state believed that its partners are achieving or likely to achieve 
relatively greater gains, the state would decline to join, leave the institution, or limit its 
commitment. States would prefer a less durable cooperative arrangement so they could 
easily end it if they believed partners were gaining more than them. Opposed to the 
neoliberal theory that argues states would prefer a small number of partners for 
verification and sanctioning advantages, realism suggests states would prefer a larger 
number of partners. (Grieco 1988) A larger number of states in a cooperative 
arrangement "enhances the likelihood that the relative achievements of gains advantaging 
better-positioned partners could be offset by more favorable sharing arising from 
interactions with weaker partners." (Grieco 1988, 506) 
Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism was a response to neorealism with the belief that realism is too 
narrow and does not account for all actors that play key roles such as international 
institutions that are looking out for the self-interest of their membership. Neoliberal 
theory defines interests in solely individualistic terms. Neoliberals agree that nation-
states are the major actors, but contrary to realists, neoliberals argue institutions can 
change state behavior. Unlike realism that argues anarchy impedes the achievement of 
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cooperation between states, liberalism argues that international institutions can promote 
cooperation between states even with the constraints of living in anarchY· (Keohane 
1984) Even if anarchy does present constraints on state cooperation, states can work 
together with the assistance of these institutions seen in example cases of the United 
Nations, NATO, and WTO. 
Though states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains, institutions can 
help states overcome this need and promote joint action through common interests. 
Unlike realism, whereas cheating and absolute gains are the primary concerns, 
neoliberals believe states can achieve absolute gains through these joint actions, cheating 
is feared to be worst-case scenario. If states are allies, neoliberals argue that states will 
less likely compete and be concerned with fellow institutional participants' gains. And as 
realism points out that there are no guarantees that an institutional fonnation will yield 
overall welfare benefits (Keohane 1984 ), neoliberal theory presumes that states will 
define norms that benefit their common interests. The theory suggests norms facilitate 
cooperation in a world in anarchy. (Kay 2004) Neoliberals are optimistic that these 
institutions and common ideology will guide states behavior. 
Institutions play a role in security relations, according to Celeste Wallander, by 
providing assets to help maintain state cooperation and reducing transaction costs. In the 
case ofNATO, the alliance developed assets for consultation, decision-making, and for 
military action to "cope with" the threat of the Soviet Union. These rules and procedures 
shaped state behavior enough so that NATO was able to adapt to new security threats. 
Therefore, states will cooperate when it is in their interest. (Wallander 2000) Institution 
adaptation is preferred because of the cost of creating new ones. In regards to transaction 
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costs, "Neoliberal theory focuses on international bargaining as measurement of effective 
reduction oftransaction costs." (Kay 2004) 
Constructivism 
Constructivists argue key aspects of International Relations are formed through 
processes of social practice and interaction. Structure and power politics are socially 
constructed, therefore, transformed by social practice. Constructivism seeks to explain 
identities and interests; the main determinants of state behavior, as structure or process 
are the focus in other theories. (Wendt 1992) Interests entice state behavior while norms 
constitute identities and interests along with offering a range of policy options in dealing 
with the issues at large. Constructivists believe norms can play a role in policy change. 
(Klotz 1995) 
Constructivists believe that realism and institutionalism do not take in account 
transnational actors and the possibility of identity change. (Klotz 1995) Advocates ofthe 
two leading theories believe states identities and interests do not change. The 
significance of states relative to other actors is declining. "Postmodern forms of world 
politics" deserve more attention then they have received in the past, even though 
sovereign states will remain the dominant actor. (Wendt 1992, 424) A self-proclaimed 
statist and realist; Alexander Wendt is an advocate of constructivism. He argues that 
statism should not be bound by realist ideas about what the term state must mean. Wendt 
stated identity and interests could not be explained from the principle of anarchy alone, 
that anarchy is what states make of it. (Wendt 1992) State identities and interests can be 
collectively transformed by individual, domestic, systemic, or transnational factors within 
anarchy. (Wendt 1992) 
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Realists and Neoliberals also neglect important questions in understanding 
international relations. Martha Finnemore posed the question, "How do states know what 
they want?" She explained that since paradigms in International Relations are framed in 
terms of power and interests, the sources of state interests should matter. Neorealists and 
neoliberalists make assumptions as to what these interests are: power, security, and 
wealth. A constructivist agrees that states do desire power, security, and wealth, but asks, 
what kind of power? What kind of security? What does security mean? What kind of 
wealth? Wealth for whom? She stated interests are constructed through social 
interaction. (Finnemore 1996) Neorealism cannot predict whether two states will be allies 
or enemies, or recognize each other as sovereign states. Anarchy cannot explain these 
behaviors, but constructivism can. (Wendt 1999) 
Constructivists are often seen as more optimistic about progress in International 
Relations than realists. Identities and interests are not grounded in material forces such 
as human nature or anarchy, but as the result of ideas and the social construction of such 
ideas. Identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas 
rather than given by nature. (Wendt 1999) Constructivists reject anarchy as the 
determining effect of behavior of international actors. Actors are not governed by 
anarchy's constrain on self-help system, their identities and interests are important in 
analyzing how they behave. Structure is an idea, not a consequence of nature, while ideas 
and processes tend to explain the social construction of identities and interests, such ideas 
and processes form a structure of their own which impact upon international actors . 
(Finnemore 1996; Wendt 1992) Realists believe structure constrains cooperation, while 
liberalism believes process can generate cooperation. (Wendt 1992) Constructivists argue 
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shared ideas, identities, and interests of actors determine cooperation, constructed by 
these shared ideas rather than rooted in human nature. Anarchy is then defined in cultural 
rather than materialistic terms. (Wendt 1999) 
Political Science and Diamonds 
Political scientists have yet to theoretically explain the phenomenon of the 
Kimberley Process; only minimum emphasis has been placed on the 'clean diamond 
club' in the field. Grant and Taylor (2004) did explain the evolution of conflict diamonds 
and described the formation of the Kimberley Process with constructivism read in 
between the lines. Assessments were also made of the accomplishments and challenges 
of the KPCS. This paper's intent is to test the International Relations theories of realism, 
neoliberalism, and constructivism hypothesizing that all three are necessary to analyze 
the creation of the Kimberley Process and understanding state compliance in r.egards to 
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. There is a gap in Political Science 
scholarship on the Kimberley Process. My methodology differs from all other scholarly 
literature because it is the only study that formally tests International Relations theories 
with the specific case of the KPCS. Data will also be collected by reports conducted by 
Global Witness, Human Rights Watch, World Diamond Council, United Nations as well 
as journalistic articles by Aljazeera and The Associated Press, and Presidential statements 
and official documents on the KPCS and the CDT A. 
Methodology 
This paper tests the three theories noted above through an assessment of a set of 
expectations for how each theory would explain the creation of the Kimberley Process 
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along with the voluntary cooperation of states participating in the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. First, I give history behind the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme as well as the United States' legislation, The Clean Diamond Trade Act, which 
implements the scheme. Second, I test realism by analyzing the U.S. involvement in the 
Kimberley Process and its compliance with the scheme. (Hl) Major Powers (a) created 
the Kimberley Process and (b) implemented the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
because of their national security interest. Third, I test neoliberalism by analyzing the 
role of the United Nations in the creation of the Kimberley Process and US compliance 
with the scheme. (H2) International Institutions mattered in (a) the creation of the 
Kimberley Process and (b) made a difference in state compliance in the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme. Fourth, I test constructivism by analyzing the role of non-
state actors, such as NGOs, De Beers, and consumers, in the creation of the Kimberley 
Process and how the existence of a new norm influenced the international community to 
comply. (H3) Major Powers were not the dominating actors in (a) the creation of the 
Kimberley Process and (b) states complied with the KPCS because of a new existing 
norm. The last section concludes my findings. My approach to these tests is strengthened 
by the variety of key role players that justify each theory such as states, institutions, 
NGO's, business corporations and the media. 
Background 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) first reported on human 
rights violations going on in African countries enduring civil wars funded by the illegal 
11 
trade of rough diamonds. NGO's and the media immediately began urging the diamond 
industry and governments to formulate a plan of action against blood diamonds. NGOs 
lobbied corporations on the issue ofblood diamonds urging them to take action and 
responsibility for crimes linked to diamonds in conflict areas. NGOs pressured industry 
leaders to make changes in their business structure by launching anti-conflict diamond 
campaigns to bring awareness to consumers about the inhumane acts linked to 
diamonds.I 0 The media publicly reminded corporations of the prior fur boycott and the 
devastation that a diamond boycott could bring to the industry (Spar 2006). In response 
to international pressure from non-state actors, diamond trading and producing countries, 
World Diamond Council, and NGO's met in Kimberley, South Africa, in May 2000, to 
discuss a solution to the illegal trade of rough diamonds. The General Assembly of the 
UN passed Resolution 55/56 on December 1, 2000 to expand the KP, giving the forum to 
detail a proposal for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds. II On 
November 29,2001, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
European Commission, and 32 countries met in Gaborone agreeing to measures to put an 
end to blood diamond trade. The Gaborone meeting mandated the UN Security Council 
to pass a resolution, endorsed by the General Assembly, to put in place trade mechanisms 
to ensure that rough diamonds will in future be exported in tamper-proof containers 
accompanied by an official certificate of origin. The three-year negotiating process, 
known as the Kimberley Process, established an international certification scheme to 
IO "Global Witness Is Working To Prevent Diamonds From Fuelling Conflict, Human 
Rights Abuses and Terrorism" available at 
http://globalwitness.org/pages/en/conflict_ diamonds.html 
II See Id. 9 
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ensure diamonds could be a positive force for development, and not fuel civil wars.12 
The KP requires each participant to enact legislation: 
• To ensure shipments of rough diamonds, imported or exported, are sealed 
and accompanied by a validated Kimberley Process Certificate; 
• To ensure no shipments of rough diamonds are imported from or exported 
to non-participants; 
• To collect and maintain official production, import and export data, and 
exchange data with other participants; 
• To bring criminal penalties on individuals or companies involved in illegal 
rough diamond trade. 
The KP also required the diamond corporation to adopt an ethical code of conduct 
in regards to conflict diamonds and labor practices. The U.S. along with 47 other 
countries announced in the Interlaken Declaration ofNovember 5, 2002, the launch of the 
KPCS, calling on participants to have their national legislation and rough diamond origin 
certification schemes in place by Jan. 1, 2003. 13 The KP extended the deadline to July 
31, 2003 , and on that date, 54 countries including all 15 members of the EU gained 
official recognition as participants. (Taylor & Grant 2004) 
KP participants and observers (diamond industry and NGOs) meet annually to 
12 See I d. 10 information on the Gaborone meeting can also be found at 
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com 
13 The Interlaken Declaration official document can be found at 
http://www .kimberleyprocess.com/ document/interlaken_ declaration_ en.html 
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have criticized the KPCS describing it as "a poorly written process that's not enforced22." 
Other organizations believe the KPCS has made a difference in limiting conflicting 
diamonds and that it does not need to be redesigned, but its provisions need to be 
enforced.23 KP members have also voiced their opinion on the matter. When the 
European Community chaired the KP in 2007, they claimed the process was at a 
"crossroads" and stating "implementation should be further strengthened and that the KP 
continue to be vigilant and deal swiftly and effectively with emerging difficulties24." 
The Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA) 
The US passed the CDTA as legislation for implementing the KPCS. Although the 
US is not a producer of rough diamonds, it is significant global trader ofboth rough and 
polished diamonds, and the world's largest consumer market for diamond jewelry. 
(Gooch 2008) The CDTA requires the US to: 
• Ensure all shipments of imported rough diamonds are in a sealed tamper-proof 
container and accompanied by a Kimberley Process Certificate; 
• Ensure all shipments of rough diamonds imported to the US are from KPCS 
participants only; 
• Ensure all shipments of rough diamonds exported from the US are to KPCS 
participants only; 
22 
"Diamonds Still Bloody Despite Efforts at Reform, Critics Contend" by Katie O'Brien 
published on Oct. 22, 2009, available at 
http://news.medill.northwestem.edu/chicago/news 
23 See Id. 15 
24 Review the 2007 Program of Action for the KP, "From Conflict Diamonds to 
Prosperity Diamonds," published by the EC 
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• Designate importing and exporting authorities; 
• Establish an interagency KP implementation coordinating committee to oversee 
US implementation efforts; 
• Collect and exchange US import and export data of rough diamonds 
• Mandate criminal penalties for any person or corporation that violates the terms in 
the CDT A. Customs laws also apply to rough diamonds imported in violation of 
the CDTA.25 
The WDC and over 100 NGOs supported the Clean Diamond Trade Act that 
proposed legislation banning the importation of conflict diamonds into the USA. (Grant 
& Taylor 2004) The US Senate and House of Representatives passed the CDTA on April 
8, 2003.26 President Bush signed the CDTA on April25, 2003, in order to implement the 
KPCS.27 On July 29, 2003, Bush signed Executive Order 13312 implementing the 
CDT A. The Act requires that except to the extent that the President can modify the 
regulations?8 NGOs welcomed the passage stating the CDTA will cut terror funding, 
human rights violations while protecting legitimate trade. Passage was credited by these 
NGOs to activists, colleagues in the anti-conflict diamond campaign, American jewelers, 
and "friends" in the House and Senate.29 
25 
"The Clean Diamond Trade Act" Public Law 108-19 1 08th Congress- April 25, 2003 
26 
"UN Backs Scheme to Block Blood Diamond Trade" published April15, 2003, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/182/33834.html 
27 See Id. 23 
28 Executive Order 13312, effective date: July 31,2003, "Implementing the Clean 
Diamond Trade Act 
29 
"Statement on the Clean Diamond Act," by Adotei Akwei, advocacy director for 
Africa amnesty International, published on April 9, 2003, available at 
http :1 lwww .amnestyusa.org/news/2003/usa04092003 .html 
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The United States Kimberley Process Authority (USKP A) is comprised of US 
agencies and the private, not-for-profit entity. The USKP A implements the international 
provisions of the CDT A as well as domestic provisions with assistance from the State 
Department, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce. The USKPA is responsible 
for facilitating the issuance ofKimberley Process Certificates reporting the statistics to 
the US government and KPCS participants. The US government currently does not have 
a plan for monitoring the USKPA, "a major weakness in US diamond law." (Gooch 
2008, 191) and the USKP A does not have a plan to supervise licensees that issue 
Kimberley Process Certificates. There have been reported problems with the KP 
certificates it has issued, raising the possibility that the certificates could have been 
tampered with. (Gooch 2008) Another weakness that has raised concerns with KPCS 
participants is the lack of a US agency confirming imports of rough diamonds. A United 
States Government Accountability Office report stated blood diamonds could enter the 
US because of major weaknesses in the implementation of the Clean Diamond Trade 
Act.30 The US sought to enhance data reporting and accuracy by implementing two 
amendments to the CDTA in 2008. The first amendment called for all shipment values of 
rough diamonds, even those valued under $2,500, to be accompanied by a Kimberley 
Process Certificate. The second amendment called for all US rough-diamond importers 
and exporters to file an annual report by April I of the year following the reported 
period.31 A report published on October 28, 2009, stated the US Department of the 
30 Information on the GAO report can be found at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/the_kimberley_process.html 
31 
"Feds Amend Clean Diamond Trade Act: Tweaks Aim to End Conflict Diamond 
Trade" published on May 28, 2008, available on the National Jeweler Network at 
http :I lwww .printthis.clickability. com 
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Treasury began to push the ~nforcement of the new KPCS requirements on importers and 
exporters of rough diamonds in June 2009 by issuing subpoenas to diamond dealers who 
were not in compliance with the CDT A. 32 Since the implementation of the CDT A, 
criminals have been charged with smuggling conflict diamonds into the US; however, 
CDTA prosecution efficiency awaits the verdicts ofthese cases.33 (Gooch 2008) 
Analysis 
Table 1: IR Theory Expectations for State Cooperation in the KP 
Realism Neoliberalism Constructivism 
Dominate Actors Major Powers Major Powers Non-state Actors 
in the creation of and International 
the Kimberley Institutions 
Process 
Reason for state National Security International New Existing 
compliance with Interest Institutions Normand 
the KPCS Interests 
Realism 
Hypothesis 1: Major Powers (a) created the Kimberley Process and (b) 
implemented the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme because of their national 
security interest. There is partial evidence for this hypothesis in the case of the United 
States. President Bush confirmed in a statement about the signing of the CDTA that the 
32 
"Kimberley Annual Reports: Enforcement Begins" published on Oct. 28, 2009, by the 
Jewelers Vigilance Committee available at 
http://www.jvclegal.org/index.php?categoryid=303 
33 On Feb. 4, 2007, Maliki Mohamad Diane and Kouate Saoud were arrested and charged 
with violating the CDTA after the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies 
seized 11,000 carats of diamonds. 
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US "played a key role over the past two years in forging an international consensus to 
curb such damaging trade and has therefore strongly supported the KP34." The US was 
one of the initial countries to get involved in the KP, being a participant in the Interlaken 
Declaration announcing the launch of the KPCS.35 The world's superpower and largest 
diamond consumer took part in the KP, without the US support, the system could have 
collapsed. (Gooch 2008; Grant & Taylor 2004) Therefore, the US was essential for the 
prospects of finding a resolution for blood diamonds and the passing of the CDT A was 
necessary to comply with KPCS. Major powers played leading roles in implementing the 
KPCS, through legislation, regulation and administrative procedures. (Wright 2004) 
States were the enforcers of the new diamond law and were responsible for punishing 
those who did not comply. The US implemented the KPCS by passing the CDTA. 
Those who violate the CDTA can face up to $50,000 in criminal penalties and $10,000 in 
civil penalties per violation.36 There is evidence that the US was a dominant actor in the 
creation of the KP and enforcing the KPCS, however, Realism fails to explain why the 
US implemented the scheme. 
A realist would assume the US would act in a manner of their own national 
security interest. NGOs and scholars pointed out the threat of blood diamonds in regards 
to the US because of their role in funding al Qaeda. Global Witness published a 
monograph For a Few Dollars More that stated al Qaeda operatives purchased Sierra 
Leonean diamonds from December 2000 to November 2001 (Grant & Taylor 2004). It 
was in the US's self-interest to reduce blood diamonds from entering the diamond market 
34 
"Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act" published by The White House 
on April25, 2003 
35 See Id. 13 
36 See Id. 23 
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in fear of funding terrorism, however, the President did not mention national security in 
his statements regarding the KPCS or CDTA during the time of signing or 
implementation. President Bush stated the KP was "an important foreign policy 
objective" because "diamonds are critical to the economic growth and development of 
African and other countries37 ," a statement that gives merit to the theory of a new existing 
norm influencing policy. Also if compliance with the KPCS were a national security 
issue, the President would have been timely in signing the CDT A. Although Congress 
passed the Act in 2001 and 2002, it had to be "reintroduced each year as the Bush 
Administration was hesitant to sign the bill into law over concerns of loopholes and 
possible conflicts with WTO parameters." (Grant & Taylor 2004) The US also did not 
implement the KPCS until after deadline. National security interest has little merit in 
explaining the state's compliance . 
N eo liberalism 
Hypothesis 2: International Institutions mattered in (a) the creation of the 
Kimberley Process and (b) made a difference in state compliance in the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme. There is little evidence for this hypothesis in the case of 
the United Nations and US. The UN mattered slightly in the creation ofthe KP. The KP 
was not a UN negotiation (Wright 2004), but was supported by the UN.38 Though the 
UN gave KP "status" (Wright 2004, 702), by backing requested mandates. Scholars have 
noted the KP "took off' because of early UN support, however, scholars also believed the 
World Diamond Council was influential. (Grant & Taylor 2004; Wright 2004) The UN 
37 See Id. 28 
38 See Id. 9 and 10 
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made somewhat of a difference in state compliance in the KPCS by urging members, 
such as the US, to comply with the KPCS and announcing sanctions on illegal diamonds 
from countries such as Angola and Liberia.39 The UN initially made a difference in US 
state compliance by supporting the KP, however, it was not effective in the US 
implementing the scheme before the initial deadline announced in the Interlaken 
Declaration. The UN remains ineffective in US compliance with the KPCS as the US 
currently struggles with enforcing the scheme and providing adequate data . 
Constructivism 
Hypothesis 3: Major Powers were not the dominating actors in (a) the creation of 
the Kimberley Process and (b) states complied with the KPCS because of a new existing 
norm. There is partial evidence for this hypothesis. NGOs, the media, and .the diamond 
industry played key roles in the creation of the KP; however, major powers were key as 
well during the Kimberley Process. NGOs and the media were dominant actors in 
bringing public awareness to the atrocities linked to blood diamonds and putting conflict 
diamonds on the international agenda. "Global Witness, Partnership Africa Canada 
(PAC), and other NGOs have had an unusual level of involvement in developing and 
building support for the scheme, helping to write the Kimberley Process Technical 
Document, and playing an active role in negotiations and implementation40." Launching 
campaigns that provoked the diamond industry to re-systemize out of fear of consumer 
boycotts (LeBillion 2006), pushed the creation of the KP as well. De Beers soon realized 
39 See Id. 9 
40 Statement published by Global Witness at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/the _kimberley _process.html 
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a certification scheme would keep excess diamonds off the market, keeping the diamond 
"rare" and "valuable." The company managed to turn "a potential attack on their business 
into a substantial windfall." (Spar 2006, 206) With support from diamond giants De 
Beers, the industry formed the World Diamond Council (WDC) to represent the diamond 
sector in the KP. 41 NGOs and the diamond industry observe KP meetings and monitor 
compliance; however, they have not been effective in current state compliance. For 
example, Global Witness called for Zimbabwe's suspension in the KPCS due to "the 
country's non-compliance with the KP requirements and wide-spread government-
sponsored human rights abuses42." 
There is partial evidence state compliance with the KPCS is due to a new existing 
norm. Over 100 American NGOs signed public letters on the issue of blood diamonds to 
diamond corporations. A coalition ofhuman rights, religious, humanitarian, peace and 
development groups mailed information packets to 4,000 American jewelry industry's 
concern, urging them not to take the path of fur. (Grant & Taylor 2004) The United States 
did not have legislation prior to the Clean Diamond Trade Act regarding the import and 
export of rough diamonds. International pressure from governments, industry, and NGOs 
with a shared idea on blood diamonds pressed the US to join the KP and pass the CDT A. 
The rapidness of conflict diamonds becoming an international priority is an 
example of the non-governmental sector, the corporate world and state governments 
coming together to resolve what was fast becoming a major human security concern. 
(Grant & Taylor 2004) The anti-conflict diamond campaign "has been largely successful 
41 See http://www.diamondfacts.org 
42 
"Failure to Suspend Zimbabwe From Blood Diamond Scheme Undermines Efforts to 
End Abuses and Clean up International Trade" published on June 6, 2009 available at 
http://www .globalwitness.org/media _library_ detail.php 
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in altering the foreign policies" of states that import and/or export diamonds. (Taylor & 
Mokhawa 2003) Similar to the anti-apartheid movement, in which Klotz demonstrated 
the campaign was constructed around the global norm of racial equality, the anti-conflict 
diamond campaign was constructed around a new global norm. The campaign 
successfully established the norm that "the purchase of diamonds from conflict-ridden 
spaces is no longer acceptable." (Taylor & Mokhawa 2003, 264) Norms on human rights 
linked to blood diamonds guided NGOs to broadcast the importance for state compliance 
in the KP. NGOs advanced the issue on the international agenda, persuading states to 
change their policies on the import and export of rough diamonds and industry to change 
their business structure around the norm. However, the US has struggled to efficiently 
implement the KPCS (Grant & Taylor 2004; Gooch 2008; Wright 2004), questioning the 
significance and legitimacy of this new norm . 
Conclusion 
Table 2: US Cooperation on Blood Diamonds 
Realism N eo liberalism Constructivism 
Assumed Dominant United States United States and NGOs, Diamond 
Actors United Nations Industry 
Dominant Actors Partial Evidence Partial Evidence Partial Evidence 
Assumed Reason for National Security Membership in the UN Global Norm on Blood 
State Compliance Interest Diamonds 
Reason for State No Evidence Very Little Evidence Partial Evidence 
Compliance 
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All three IR theories are needed to analyze state compliance in the KPCS because 
each theory fails to explain the case fully. I found NGOs were dominant actors in putting 
the issue of conflict diamonds on the international agenda, while institutions legitimized 
the KP; states were the dominant actors in enforcing the KPCS. All three theories lack a 
complete explanation for state compliance in the KPCS to combat blood diamond. The 
US did not comply with the KPCS out of a national security interest, as realism would 
have assumed. Institutions mattered only slightly in initiating state compliance in the KP, 
but are ineffective in state implementation of the KPCS. Constructivism proved non-
state actors played a key role in the KPCS creation and may have brought to light a new 
existing global norm, but non-compliance and ineffective ways to address it bring the 
norm in doubt. This research adds a case to the "exceptions" of realism, neoliberalism, 
and constructivist theory. The triple theory failure calls for a new model to ~xplain world 
politics shifted by government, industry, and civil society . 
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